Competitive Occupational Licensure: Doctors Versus Chiropractors
This paper provides the first analysis of competitive occupational licensure, where substitute professions maintain separate licensing boards that set entry requirements strategically. I develop and structurally estimate a model where professional organizations choose licensing stringency to maximize industry profits while accounting for competitive responses, as workers with heterogeneous abilities select occupations based on expected returns and consumers observe only average quality within each profession. Testing this theory using historical competition between medical doctors (MDs) and chiropractors (DCs) from 1907-1960, I exploit digitized American Medical Association records and state-by-year variation in chiropractic board adoption. Medical boards responded strategically by increasing college requirements by 10 percentage points, mandating internships (10+ percentage points), and reducing pass rates by 5 percentage points. These regulatory changes generated substantial economic effects: doctors home values rose by 26% while their numbers declined by 17-40 practitioners per 100,000 population, and chiropractors saw 44% higher home values with increased market presence of 2-12 practitioners per 100,000. Structural estimation reveals that observed equilibria closely approximate profit-maximizing sequential competition rather than welfare-maximizing behavior.
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